The Indicative and Imperative Nature of Faith and New Life

This is a section out of my senior thesis on sanctification. What it addresses is the seemingly conflicting scriptural portrayal of rebirth and renewal as being, at one time, solely the work of God, and at another, an imperative placed on man to conform to God's will. It is a matter of resolving indicative and imperative. Various Lutherans have addressed this issue, namely, Paul Althaus, Helmut Thielicke, Adolf Köberle, and to a certain extent, David Scaer. Helmut Thielicke, though, is the one who really hits the nail on the head in the first volume of his Theological Ethics. I have previously written on this topic in my post The Word, Communication, and Sanctification.

We heard a little on this topic from Paul Althaus in the post Althaus on Faith and Command. There are a couple of things in his portrayal that are not quite correct. 1) Althaus talks of: "Insofar as it is God's gift." When talking of indicative and imperative, we cannot say: insofar as it is indicative/ insofar as it is imperative. We have to affirm that it is, at the same time, fully indicative and fully imperative. 2) Another problem with Althaus' portrayal is that he talks of rebirth and renewal (faith and new life) as being, from the standpoint of God, indicative, and from the standpoint of man, imperative. Indicative and imperative is not a matter of perspective, as if man simply acts and thinks as if it were all his work, while in reality it being solely the work and fruit of God. Paul makes it clear that when man acts in autonomy from acknowledgment of his total reliance on God's grace, he acts in rebellion to God. We hear from Paul:

"Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God who works in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure" (Phil. 2:12-13).

"So, then, it is not of the one willing, nor of the one running, but of the One showing mercy, of God" (Rom. 9:16).

God tells us: "My grace is sufficient for you, for My power is perfected in weakness" (2 Cor. 12:9).

When God says "weakness," he does not mean, those who are especially deficient in themselves, rather those who recognize that without Christ, the Vine, they can do nothing (John 15:5). But we, at the same time affirm, "[We] can do all things through him who strengthens [us]" (Phil. 4:13). When we look at the subject of Christ's beatitudes compared to, say, the Pharisees, the difference is not that the Pharisees are stronger, etc., rather, it is the poor in spirit, the mourning, the meek who recognize their total dependence on God's grace, this is why they are called blessed; we are all πτωχοι, literally, beggars in spirit, and yet, in this, we are blessed!

The Lutheran understanding of faith is a perfect example of the indissoluble connection of indicative and imperative. Emil Brunner writes: "The Word of God and the word of faith are inseparable. It is not God who believes but I myself who believe; yet I do not believe of myself, but because of God's speech." (Man in Revolt: A Christian Anthropology, trans. Olive Wyon (Cambridge: Lutterworth Press, 2002), 67.) Faith is at one and the same time completely the work and fruit of the Spirit of God, working through the Word, and yet, it is also my response to God's Word, God's claim on me. Faith is never, whether at the outset, in the midst, or at the end, a fruit of anything that is in me, and yet it is I who believe, it is I who say "yes." The Formula of Concord can even say that we "accept the offered grace." (SD Art. II, Par. 83) This is not inappropriate language if, and only if, the relation of indicative and imperative are understood correctly.

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The Indicative and Imperative Nature of Sanctification

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Lutheran Quote of the Day: Köberle on the Relation of Justification and the Nova Vita

This is a very interesting, if a little simplisitic depiction of the various views of Melanchthon, Luther, Osiander, and Rome between justification and the new life. Adolf Köberle adopts what he believes is Luther's position. Köberle sees the relation between justification and sanctification as paradoxical, as he believes is the position of Luther. While I'm not sure if Luther saw it as such, I certainly don't. Köberle can talk of justification and sanctification as essentially the same act of God though distinguished theologically and by their "inner sequence." I guess I would say that I have a more simplisitc view of their relation. I see them as stemming from the same motivation of God, to restore mankind into a proper relationship with him and with the rest of creation, but not as the same act. I see objective justification as the whole of God's promises to us through Christ, encompasing the whole of salvation history including the Substitutionary Atonement of Christ, the promise of the Holy Spirit's ministry of the Word establishing faith, the promise of sanctification's beginning and consumation upon death, and everlasting life in communion with God and neighbor; that is, Christ's work on the cross brings with it all the promises of the Deus pro nobis, while the individual works-- Atonement, subjective justification, sanctification, etc.--are essentially different.

I just read an excellent article that deals with the very same subject that Köberle talks of here. Though quite a bit longer, I would highly recommend it. It is by R. Scott Clark, entitled: "Iustitia Imputata Christi: Alien or Proper to Luther's Doctrine of Justification?" Clark gives a very thorough examination of the topic, especially of the evolution of Luther's thought, which is so important when trying to establish what Luther's "real" thoughts were. His conclusions are startingly similar to Köberle's.

"All the possible relations of justification and the nova vita came to the fore at least once during the period of the Reformation. Historically they can be designated by the names of Melanchthon, Luther, Osiander and the Council of Trent. What was produced later was partly a deepening, partly a mixture of the previous positions in which unfortunately the most successful solution, that of Luther, was the least considered.

"In the Apology Melanchthon still kept the justum pronuntiari et effici side by side, though the emphasis is already completely on the pardoning judicial decree of God. Following the publication of the Commentary on Romans, 1532, however, the word justification more and more loses its double meaning and at last receives an exclusively forensic character. It is possible to claim that without this sharpened, "disjunctive" form of the sola fide teaching could not have been maintained in the difficult crises of the following centuries. The rejection of every amalgamation not only brought to Melanchthon's theology the advantage of greater systematic clarity but it also really avowed in a unique way the central thought of the Reformation, "Thy loving kindness is better than life (Ps. 63:4). On occasion there are men to whom we must be grateful for having always said only one thing. This gratitude is owing to Melanchthon in the second half of the sixteenth century and to Herman Cramer and his spiritual kindred in the nineteenth century. It is true that both Holl (Rechtfertigungslehre des Protestantismus, pp. 18 seq.) and Hirsch (Die Theologie des A. Osiander, pp. 267 seq.) have pointed out, not without reason, that this separation of justification and renewal in the course of time brought with it questionable consequences. The preservation of the "article of a standing or falling Church" in the school of Melanchthonian orthodoxy cost something, for in time wide circles sought to satisfy their desire for renovation, that was here inadequately presented, in Pietism or Roman Catholic mysticism. Because of its great historic significance, however, Melanchthon's teaching should always be criticised with moderation. As a systematic solution it is certainly not satisfactory.

"With Luther the primary question was likewise not that of making holy but of being accounted holy. The communion with God that has been interrupted by guilt can only be again restored through the removal of guilt (Cf. the Heidelberg disputation of 1518). But besides Anselm and Occam, Luther was also influenced by Augustine and the Mystics who alike (under the influence of Eastern theology) emphatically placed the effective overcoming of the power of sin in the foreground. Besides the idea of the imputation of the righteousness of God we always find associated with it in Luther's ideas the belief in the commencement and continuation of a progressive renewal of life, but with the righteousness of faith ranking above the renewal. For in quite a unique way Luther understood how to distinguish in thought ideas that were for him a real unity; an evidence that he was not so careless in systematizing as men like to picture him. He wanted to distinguish between "external" righteousness and "inner" sanctification but without separating them from each other. His linking together of the two while at the same time maintaining their correct inner sequence will always remain the ideal solution to the problem. So, and only so, will justification be preserved from the danger of quietism and sanctification from the danger of perfectionism. If, on the other hand, the attempt is made to divide the remissio and the regeneratio into two separate acts, occurring at different times, each will waste away with mutual injury.

"A closer examination will further be able to distinguish three periods in Luther's development, each having a different emphasis in the treatment of the constituent parts of this relationship. There is a first period in which he so strongly emphasizes the effici alongside of the reputari that he interchanges them without any scruple and even speaks of a magis et magis justificari. Otto Ritschl (Dogmengeschichte des Protestantismus, II, 1, Chap. 28 seq.) includes the lectures on Romans in this period. Then, however, the emphasis begins to fall ever morre strongly on the Christus pro nobis, which, definitely given the pre-eminence, is combined with the Christus in nobis. Here (say in the commentary on Galatians of 1522-35) is the real climax of Luther's creative activity. In the later part of his life, as a result of his experiences, he approaches closer to the attitude of Melanchthon. The justitia aliena which we already find clearly indicated in the writings of 1520-1521 is more and more placed in contrast to renewal. It is certain, however, that Luther at all times, though with varying degrees of emphasis, held fast to the essential connection of justification and sanctification, while at the same time making clearly the theological difference between the two conceptions.

"What Luther so vigorously welded together was again split apart by Melanchthon as ha gained consideration for a purely imputative view of justification. While the wealth of meaning in dikaioun [justify as forensic aquital] was thus narrowed, through this one-sidedness, the free, pardoning operation of God's grace in behalf of the sinner was given powerful expression. In this way the central thought of the Reformation was not weakened but actually strengthened. Far more serious were the results on the other side, when the emphasis was laid on the effective aspect, when instead of the promise of God the moral change was made most important for the establishment and maintenance of the relationship with God. This was the case with Osiander. He too started with Luther's teaching but instead of stressing the forensic aspect, like Melanchthon, he turned to its effective, immanent aspects. He was strengthened in this position, as E. Hirsch clearly pointed out, through linguistic, philosophical Logos speculations of the Cabalistic and Neoplatonic sort, which he had acquired particularily from Reuchin and Pico della Mirandola. In so far as he made the external word of Scripture the vehicle of the inner justitia essentialis he remained a Lutheran, but when he opposed the teaching of imputation without rightly understanding it, and made the certainty of salvation depend on a progressive qualitas habitualis in animo he became a Thomist. So the certainty based on the forgiveness of sins became a merely subjective assurance that, because it required continual augmentation, was always insufficient. The effects became the cause; the extent of inner experience supplanted the assurance of a divine promise. Infusion took the place of forgiveness; the sanatio that of the imputatio and a quality of the soul supplanted a divine objectivity. Luther too had taught the activity of the one who was justified but for him that was too uncertain and variable a basis to permit faith to be grounded on it; the righteousness that enters into us is only a beginning and therefore only fragmentary. The righteousness, however, that is imputed coram deo is tota et perfecta. Osiander's ethical protest against the academic externalizing of justification was well meant but his view of the essential infusion of the divine nature of Christ alone, as the means of attaining righteousness before God, not only upset a correct christology (perfectus deus, perfectus homo, Athanasian Creed) but it also distorted the reformers' message of free grace into an ethical-rational sphere. A teaching so strongly reminiscent of the gratia infusa of Roman sacramental theology was no weapon for a Church that had just learned by hard conflicts to find vera et firma consolatio in the gratia extra nos posita. (Cf. Hirsch, p. 271 and the Formula of Concord, Sol. Decl. 623, 59 seq.)

"We can perhaps formulate it thus: for grace, Melanchthon says forgivenss; Luther says forgiveness and sanctification [see my post: "Hey! Let's Keep it Forensic in Here!" ]; Osiander, sanctification and forgiveness. The Roman Church for grace, says only sanctification. The use of the word to describe a purely divine act and a valid promise of grace is expressly forbidden. Si quis dixerit, sola fide impium justificare...anathema sit (Trid. sessio VI, can. 9). Justification becomes exclusively a process of justification (transmutatio), the gratia forensis becomes a gratia habitualis, that through sacramental power is poured into the will. If in Osiander's teaching the renovating power of grace that establishes salvation was still bound in its operation to the viva vox dei in His Word, here, under the influence of Greek theology and a conception of God as a substance, that had been drawn from ancient philosophy, the operation was conceived of as something naturally substantial and consequently magical (actio dei physica). The freely promising, personal working of God is here dissolved into an inner dynamic, an operative function. With such a conception of grace it is no longer possible to speak of a real assurance of salvation."

-Adolf Köberle, The Quest for Holiness, trans. John C. Mattes (Minneapolis, Minn: Augsburg Publishing House, 1938), 92-94 (Excursus).

Lutheran Quote of the Day: Köberle on the Work of the Gospel

I really appreciate this quote from Adolf Köberle. I think people who have been in the faith for a long time get complacent in their interaction with the gospel. We need to ever be reminded of the surpassingly wonderful gift of salvation. It is easy to turn justification into a theory, as Oswald Bayer might say. Köberle gives us a reality check here, he makes sure we never forget our "first love" (Rev. 2:4), and reminds us that the gospel of Christ is the "power of God to salvation to everyone believing" (Rom. 1:16). It is always refreshing to observe people who are new to the faith and how different they often approach the gospel compared to the often digressive tendencies of us who grew up in the church.

"Any one who knows but a little of what is being accomplished out on the mission fields through the operation of the Gospel; any one who knows something of the strength of faith and sacrifice that is shown by the baptized heathen who so shortly before were still in fetters, will be inclined to be ashamed of this "European theology" which, as a result of scholastic investigation and almost a century of submersion in materialism seems to have forgotten how to trust in God's greatness or how to ask great things of Him. Here the "paralytic Christianity" (Blumhardt) of the West must turn back and again learn to become like the little children; it must learn from the foolish how the first shall be last and the last first. The thing that impresses every student of missions is the striking parallels he finds to the accounts given by St. Paul of his missionary experiences [see my post: The Power of a Simple Message...]. Here, as there, we find evidence of "actually existing and easily demonstrable operations" of an external power. We see a great break with the heathen past, as for example, in the case of the "great repentance" on the island of Nias in the year 1917. In these fields the fear of demons and the tyranny of sorcery lose their power over enslaved men, as happened once at Ephesus. Shame and repentance, modesty and fervor in prayer appear in hearts before barren and hardened. And all that takes place not as the result of moral compulsion but through the overwhelming conviction of the Spirit working through the Word. In the same way the work of Inner Missions has its Pauline parallels. Here we can see how through the spiritual power of the preaching of the Cross and Resurrection the specific and very real vices of the great cities are overcome, now as then, and how the Easter power of purity becomes manifest."

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-The Quest for Holiness, trans. John C. Mattes (Minneapolis, Minn: Augsburg Publishing House, 1938), 123-124.

Melanchthon on "Spiritual Matters"

It will be remembered that Adolf Köberle believed Lutherans were especially drawn to either extreme of moralism or mysticism. I believe that we, especially in the LC-MS, have been drawing closer and closer to the side of moralism. Of this Köberle writes:

"There is another [error] that makes so little testimony of the Holy Ghost, Who quickeneth us, that we might think Christ had never risen and Pentecost had never happened. Here the new life appears as a purely transcendental thing, as a mere object of hope and as something quite beyond the possibility of attainment in our present historical situation." The Quest for Holiness, trans. John C. Mattes (Minneapolis, Minn: Augsburg Publishing House, 1938), viii

I think this is no more evident than in the recent resurgence of Luther's teaching of the two kinds of righteousness-- civil and imputed. While historically there are many things about this teaching that were important for correcting error, the claim of there being only civil and imputed righteousness is theologically incorrect. This teaching did make clear 1) The importance and validity of our daily callings (against man made acts of righteousness e.g., monasticism), and 2) the importance of leaving our horizontal righteousness out of the equation of our justification before God. It gave the ordinary man comfort in knowing that their calling as father, worker, etc., was important in God's eyes, and not inferior to other so-called "higher callings." It also let people know that their status as children of God depended on the promises of God, not on what they did.

While imputed righteousness continues to stand unpolluted in the Lutheran Church, the thought that civil righteousness, if properly understood, constitutes the only other righteousness in the life of the believer is an error.

For those who might not be as conversant in Lutheran terminology, this is how the Lutheran Confessions define civil righteousness:

"We maintain that God requires the righteousness of reason [civil righteousness] and that because of God's command honorable works prescribed in the Decalogue are necessary according to [Gal. 3:24]: "The law was our disciplinarian"; and [1 Tim. 1:9]: "The law is laid down not for the innocent but for the lawless and disobedient." God wants those who live according to the flesh to be restrained by such civil discipline, and to preserve it he has given laws, learning, teaching, governments, and penalties." (Kolb/Wengert Apology Art. IV, Par. 22)

Of the two kinds of righteousness, the proponents argue, "Righteousness has to do with meeting God’s “design specifications” for being a human creature and fulfilling the purpose for which God created us. It has to do with being fully human, that is, as God intended us to be when He created us." (Charles Arand and Joel Biermann, "Why the Two Kinds of Righteousness?" Concordia Journal 33, no. 2 (2007), 118.) It is said that imputed righteousness defines our humanity as to our vertical relationship before God, and that civil righteousness defines our humanity as to our horizontal relationship before the world. These two kinds of righteousness, then, are what make us "fully human." If civil righteousness, as defined in the Apology above, is what defines my being human in the world, then this is a very sad theology.

It is exactly these broad theological claims that I believe are reckless and dangerous in this new approach to Lutheran theology. The attempt to adopt this as a theological framework for a person's whole existence is distressing.

Not only does it promote an incorrect understanding of the law, human existence, the activity of God and the activity of man, and any real understanding of sanctification, it is also a mass re-working of the Lutheran theological tradition. Those who are promoting this approach to Lutheran theology have turned to the Confessions and the early Lutheran theological tradition to bolster the two kinds of righteousness as "a Wittenberg way of thinking."

I have recently been working at examining the historical claims of the two kinds of righteousness and have been able to find little support for the claim that the Confessions and early Lutheran church adopted the teaching of the two kinds of righteousness as a vital part of their teaching (if at all). The proponents themselves admit that it does not take on an explicit presence in the Confessions and early Lutheran Church, and so, say that it functioned more as a presupposition. Robert Kolb writes:

"This distinction of two kinds of righteousness functioned as a presupposition for all that Luther said about the human being and the human relationship with God. As a presupposition rather than a dogmatic topic in itself, it did not become a standard part of the list of teachings in Lutheran dogmatics because the form for presenting Biblical teaching that Philip Melanchthon bequeathed his students did not have a place for the presentation of presuppositions. Using the best linguistic theories of their time, those of the Biblical humanists, Melanchthon adapted rhetorical forms from that movement, chief among them the organization of material to be taught in categories or topics, called loci communes (commonplaces) in the academic Latin of his day. In many details the Wittenberg theologians left behind the model of Peter Lombard’s Sententiae, which had provided the configuration for Western public rendering of the Biblical message since the eleventh century (though Lombard’s outline of topics did shape
Melanchthon’s organization of his own topics to some extent). However, Melanchthon’s second and third editions of the Loci did follow Lombard’s model in simply beginning with the topic, “On God.” The communication theory of the time did not recognize any need for laying down the conceptual framework of its way of thinking–although in at least one preface to the work, Melanchthon did sketch the framework of distinguishing Law and Gospel.

"Nonetheless, within the Wittenberg practice of theology there is a place for modern interpreters to make certain that its presuppositional framework is made clear. The Wittenberg team sometimes called the whole of Biblical teaching a corpus doctrinae, a “body of doctrine,” and the individual topics were members, or articuli, of that body. Even though the Wittenberg theologians did not have a way to describe it, it is true that presuppositions run like a nervous system or a circulatory system through the entire body, shaping a number of the specific topics. Therefore, we can recognize the critical role of the distinction of two kinds of righteousness— the two dimensions of humanity—as a critical anthropological presupposition for the exposition and proclamation of a number of topics of Biblical teaching even if this is not made explicitly clear in the tradition." ("God and His Human Creatures in Luther's Sermons on Genesis: The Reformer's Early Use of His Distinction of Two Kinds of Righteousness" Concordia Journal 33, no. 2 (2007), 172-173.)

Historically speaking, the current presence of the two kinds of righteousness in Lutheran theology is more a product of the Luther Renaissance's emphasis on Luther's dialectical theology-- law/gospel, two kingdoms, two kinds of righteousness-- than it is of any sustained Lutheran acceptance of Luther's two kinds of righteousness. The fact is, the Lutheran Confessions nor early Lutheran Orthodoxy promoted this teaching, and it has never been a part of our dogmatic tradition. Francis Pieper does not address the claim of there being two kinds of righteousness, and emphasises that there needs to be a distinction between unregenerate civil righteousness and Christian righteousness (something that civil righteousness does not admit).

The proponents of this teaching claim that the Confessions clearly support and make the distinction between the two kinds of righteousness. There are numerous terms that the Confessors use in connection with "righteousness," the proponents of this teaching have taken all of them and placed them into the two camps; Charles Arand writes:

"Melanchthon variously describes this as the righteousness of reason (iustitia rationis), the righteousness of the law (iustitia legis), civil righteousness (iustitia civilis), one’s own righteousness (iustitia propria), carnal righteousness (iustitia carnis), righteousness of works (iustitia operum) and philosophical righteousness. The second is a Christian righteousness that we receive by faith’s apprehension of the promise of Christ. Melanchthon variously expresses this as spiritual righteousness (iustitia spiritualis), inner righteousness, eternal righteousness (iustitia aeterna), the righteousness of faith (iustitia fidei), the righteousness of the gospel (iustitia evangelii); Christian righteousness (iustitia christiana); righteousness of God (iustitia Dei), and the righteousness of the heart (iustitia cordis)." ("Two Kinds of Righteousness as a Framework for Law and Gospel in the Apology" Lutheran Quarterly 15, no. 4 (2001), 420.)

While the terms in the first grouping are essentially synonymous, there are various terms in the second group that are not. In this post I want to address the meaning that spiritual righteousness has within the Augsburg Confession and the Apology of the Augsburg Confession. While I have briefly touched on this in an earlier post, this will be a more comprehensive look at, specifically, the way the term "spiritual" is used and understood by Melanchthon.

A not unimportant point to start is to look again at a quote from Martin Chemnitz' Loci Theologici:

"We speak of spiritual powers or activities because in Rom. 7:14 the Law is described as "spiritual." That is, it is not content with certain outward, civil activities which the unregenerate flesh can perform. Rather, the Law demands such impulses and activities as cannot be accomplished without the working of the Holy Spirit. These the flesh cannot perform, for the flesh hinders the Holy Spirit in his work, not only by evil desires (Rom. 7:8), but also by the wisdom of the flesh (Rom. 8:7). Frequently when we speak of spiritual impulses, we think of the knowledge, fear, faith, and love of God. For it is characteristic of these affections that they cannot be produced by the flesh. However, in the case of other virtues, such as temperance, chastity, bravery, freedom, etc., the distinction is not so clear; even human reason has such virtues. But we must distinguish on the basis of causes and goals. For example, the chastity of Joseph had a different cause from that of Scipio." (In The Doctrine of Man in Classical Lutheran Theology, ed. Herman A. Preus and Edmund Smits (Minneapolis, Minn: Augsburg Publishing House, 1962), 95.)

The reason this is significant is because 1) Chemnitz' Loci Theologici is based on and taken from Melanchthon's Loci Communes and thus important for understanding Melanchthon's mindset(notice the inclusive language; Chemnitz is talking of the Lutheran theological tradition), and 2) what Chemnitz says is clearly borne out over and over again in the AC and Ap.

We see this language of Chemnitz--"Frequently when we speak of spiritual impulses, we think of the knowledge, fear, faith, and love of God."--repeated over and over again in the AC and Ap:

"Therefore, although we concede to free will the liberty and power to perform the outward works of the Law, yet we do not ascribe to free will these spiritual matters, namely, truly to fear God, truly to believe God, truly to be confident and hold that God regards us, hears us, forgives us, etc." (Tappert, Apology Art. XVIII, Par. 73)

"The kingdom of Christ is spiritual [inasmuch as Christ governs by the Word and by preaching], to wit, beginning in the heart the knowledge of God, the fear of God and faith, eternal righteousness, and eternal life; meanwhile it permits us outwardly to use legitimate political ordinances of every nation in which we live." (Tappert, Apology Art. XVI, Par. 54)

"If we follow this, monasticism will be no more a state of perfection than the life of a farmer or mechanic. For these are also, states in which to acquire perfection. For all men, in every vocation, ought to seek perfection, that is, to grow in the fear of God, in faith, in love towards one's neighbor, and similar spiritual virtues." (Tappert, Apology Art. XXVII, Par. 37)

"We are speaking of true, i.e., of spiritual unity [we say that those are one harmonious Church who believe in one Christ; who have one Gospel, one Spirit, one faith, the same Sacraments; and we are speaking, therefore, of spiritual unity], without which faith in the heart, or righteousness of heart before God, cannot exist. For this we say that similarity of human rites, whether universal or particular, is not necessary, because the righteousness of faith is not a righteousness bound to certain traditions [outward ceremonies of human ordinances] as the righteousness of the Law was bound to the Mosaic ceremonies, because this righteousness of the heart is a matter that quickens the heart. To this quickening, human traditions, whether they be universal or particular, contribute nothing; neither are they effects of the Holy Ghost, as are chastity, patience, the fear of God, love to one's neighbor, and the works, of love." (Tappert, Apology Art. VII and VIII, Par. 31)

"And such are the sacrifices of the New Testament, as Peter teaches, 1 Pet. 2, 5: An holy priesthood, to offer up spiritual sacrifices. Spiritual sacrifices, however, are contrasted not only with those of cattle, but even with human works offered ex opere operato, because spiritual refers to the movements of the Holy Ghost in us. Paul teaches the same thing Rom. 12, 1: Present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable, which is your reasonable service. Reasonable service signifies, however, a service in which God is known, and apprehended by the mind, as happens in the movements of fear and trust towards God." (Tappert, Apology Art. XXIV, Par. 26)

From these quotes alone we see that Melanchthon, in using the term "spiritual," is clearly trying to distinguish between the mere outward act, whether in accordance with the law or even in the forms of worship, and the heart in which these things are done. Also of note is that Melanchthon does not just mean a vertical fear/love/trust/faith in God but also a horizontal love of neighbor, chastity, patience, etc. Also in these quotes we see brought into question such terms as eternal righteousness and righteousness of the heart, namely, Melanchthon makes it clear that these righteousness' are a righteousness that is worked in the heart of the believer, therefore not a righteousness that is declared and imputed to us from outside. If this were otherwise it would completely obscure the objective nature of the divine verdict of not guilty, making it a subjective quality in the heart of man.

Another interesting look into the way Melanchthon made a distinction between the external doing of the law and the internal motivation, without which we truly don't understand the law, is his understanding of 2 Cor. 3. We will first show how it is understood in the Formula of Concord, which Chemnitz co-authored and which is, no doubt, informed by Melanchthon's interpretation:

"For since the mere preaching of the Law, without Christ, either makes presumptuous men, who imagine that they can fulfil the Law by outward works, or forces them utterly to despair, Christ takes the Law into His hands, and explains it spiritually, Matt. 5, 21ff ; Rom. 7, 14 and 1, 18, and thus reveals His wrath from heaven upon all sinners, and shows how great it is; whereby they are directed to the Law, and from it first learn to know their sins aright—a knowledge which Moses never could extort from them. For as the apostle testifies, 2 Cor. 3, 14f, even though Moses is read, yet the veil which he put over his face is never lifted, so that they cannot understand the Law spiritually, and how great things it requires of us, and how severely it curses and condemns us because we cannot observe or fulfil it. Nevertheless, when it shalt turn to the Lord, the veil shalt be taken away, 2 Cor. 3, 16." (Tappert, Solid Declaration Art. V, Par. 10)

In the Apology, Melanchthon similarly writes:

"But Christ was given for this purpose, namely, that for His sake there might be bestowed on us the remission of sins, and the Holy Ghost to bring forth in us new and eternal life, and eternal righteousness [to manifest Christ in our hearts, as it is written John 16, 15: He shall take of the things of Mine, and show them unto you. Likewise, He works also other gifts, love, thanksgiving charity, patience, etc.]. Wherefore the Law cannot be truly kept unless the Holy Ghost be received through faith. Accordingly, Paul says that the Law is established by faith, and not made void; because the Law can only then be thus kept when the Holy Ghost is given. And Paul teaches 2 Cor. 3, 15 sq., the veil that covered the face of Moses cannot be removed except by faith in Christ, by which the Holy Ghost is received. For he speaks thus: But even unto this day, when Moses is read, the veil is upon their heart. Nevertheless, when it shall turn to the Lord, the veil shall be taken away. Now the Lord is that Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty. Paul understands by the veil the human opinion concerning the entire Law, the Decalog and the ceremonies, namely, that hypocrites think that external and civil works satisfy the Law of God, and that sacrifices and observances justify before God ex opere operato. But then this veil is removed from us, i.e., we are freed from this error when God shows to our hearts our uncleanness and the heinousness of sin. Then, for the first time, we see that we are far from fulfilling the Law. Then we learn to know how flesh, in security and indifference, does not fear God, and is not fully certain that we are regarded by God, but imagines that men are born and die by chance. Then we experience that we do not believe that God forgives and hears us. But when, on hearing the Gospel and the remission of sins, we are consoled by faith, we receive the Holy Ghost so that now we are able to think aright concerning God, and to fear and believe God, etc. From these facts it is apparent that the Law cannot be kept without Christ and the Holy Ghost." (Tappert, Art. IV, Par. 11-14)

There are notable similarities between these two quotes and between them and the previous quotes. 1) Though Melanchthon does not use the term spiritual, both of these quotes are intent on distinguishing between the mere external/civil act and the heart in which the act is done, and 2) they both show the full depth of the law that accuses us not only because we do not fulfill the external act, but also because we do not do the external act in faith and love. Likewise, though Melanchthon does not use the term "spiritual," he does repeat much of the language that we saw in the previous quotes-- "love, thanksgiving charity, patience, etc.," "[the flesh] does not fear God, and is not fully certain that we are regarded by God," "we experience that we do not believe that God forgives and hears us," and "so that now we are able to think aright concerning God, and to fear and believe God, etc."; this is all terminology straight out of the previous quotes we read above concerning "spiritual matters" (see especially, quoted above, Apology Art. XVIII, Par. 73). Also we hear repeated the term "eternal righteousness" which again is shown as a quality worked in the heart (thus not imputed righteousness) and is also connected with "love, thanksgiving charity, patience, etc."

The most important aspect of Melanchthon's and the Formula of Concord's interpretation of 2 Cor. 3 concerns "the full depth of the law." That is, only when we see the law as spiritual do we realize that the law commands not only the civil/external doing of the law but also the heart and motivation in which these acts are done. This is one of the biggest problems with seeing the regenerate's horizontal righteousness as being ideally "civil righteousness" (which even the unregenerate can fulfill). If we promote that in our horizontal life we are expected to fulfill only the external doing of the law we are lying to our congregations. We are expected not only to fulfill the external act but we are also expected to do this with love/fear/trust in God and love for neighbor. By promoting the two kinds of righteousness, those being civil and imputed, we emasculate the law, making it merely a domesticated godliness of: "avoid gross expressions of sins, mind your vocations, do your best." It is a watered down moralism, but moralism nonetheless.

Melanchthon tellingly, in Love and the Fulfilling of the Law, writes that what God expects of us is not only the external doing but also that which is internal, that is, what is spiritual:

"We, therefore, profess that it is necessary that the Law be begun in us, and that it be observed continually more and more. And at the same time we comprehend both spiritual movements and external good works [the good heart within and works without]. Therefore the adversaries falsely charge against us that our theologians do not teach good works while they not only require these, but also show how they can be done [that the heart must enter into these works, lest they be mere, lifeless, cold works of hypocrites]. The result convicts hypocrites, who by their own powers endeavor to fulfil the Law, that they cannot accomplish what they attempt. [For are they free from hatred, envy, strife, anger, wrath, avarice, adultery, etc.? Why, these vices were nowhere greater than in the cloisters and sacred institutes.] For human nature is far too weak to be able by its own powers to resist the devil, who holds as captives all who have not been freed through faith. There is need of the power of Christ against the devil, namely, that, inasmuch as we know that for Christ's sake we are heard, and have the promise, we may pray for the governance and defense of the Holy Ghost, that we may neither be deceived and err, nor be impelled to undertake anything contrary to God's will. [Otherwise we should, every hour, fall into error and abominable vices.] Just as Ps. 68, 18 teaches: Thou hast led captivity captive; Thou hast received gifts for man. For Christ has overcome the devil, and has given to us the promise and the Holy Ghost, in order that, by divine aid, we ourselves also may overcome. And 1 John 3, 8: For this purpose the Son of God was manifested, that He might destroy the works of the devil. Again, we teach not only how the Law can be observed, but also how God is pleased if anything be done, namely, not because we render satisfaction to the Law, but because we are in Christ, as we shall say after a little. It is, therefore, manifest that we require good works. Yea, we add also this, that it is impossible for love to God, even though it be small, to be sundered from faith, because through Christ we come to the Father, and the remission of sins having been received, we now are truly certain that we have a God, i.e., that God cares for us; we call upon Him, we give Him thanks, we fear Him, we love Him as 1 John 4, 19 teaches: We love Him, because He first loved us, namely, because He gave His Son for us, and forgave us our sins. Thus he indicates that faith precedes and love follows. Likewise the faith of which we speak exists in repentance, i.e., it is conceived in the terrors of conscience, which feels the wrath of God against our sins, and seeks the remission of sins, and to be freed from sin. And in such terrors and other afflictions this faith ought to grow and be strengthened. Wherefore it cannot exist in those who live according to the flesh who are delighted by their own lusts and obey them. Accordingly, Paul says, Rom. 8, 1: There is, therefore, now no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit. So, too 8, 12. 13: We are debtors, not to the flesh, to live after the flesh. For if ye live after the flesh, ye shall die; but if ye, through the Spirit, do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live. Wherefore, the faith which receives remission of sins in a heart terrified and fleeing from sin does not remain in those who obey their desires, neither does it coexist with mortal sin." (Tappert, Apology Art IV, Par. 15-23)

This quote is undeniably one of the most important statements on the Lutheran understanding of sanctification. Melanchthon, against the claims of Rome, tells us that, not only do the Churches of the Augsburg Confession teach and promote good works, but also they teach what good works actually are--both internal motivation and external action-- and unlike Rome inform their congregations how these works are fulfilled, namely that we cannot do them, but that through the power of Christ and the Holy Spirit, we can. Melanchthon is expressly arguing against Rome who only talked about civil righteousness, the external doing of the action without the aid of God. Against this Melanchthon writes:

"Therefore the adversaries falsely charge against us that our theologians do not teach good works while they not only require these, but also show how they can be done [that the heart must enter into these works, lest they be mere, lifeless, cold works of hypocrites]. The result convicts hypocrites, who by their own powers endeavor to fulfil the Law, that they cannot accomplish what they attempt...For human nature is far too weak to be able by its own powers to resist the devil, who holds as captives all who have not been freed through faith. There is need of the power of Christ against the devil, namely, that, inasmuch as we know that for Christ's sake we are heard, and have the promise, we may pray for the governance and defense of the Holy Ghost, that we may neither be deceived and err, nor be impelled to undertake anything contrary to God's will."

Melanchthon is arguing against exactly what many Lutherans are now trying to promote. Listen to how the two kinds of righteousness are defined: Imputed: "Thus, before God (coram Deo) we are entirely passive, and so our righteousness is passive, not active." ("Why Two Kinds of Righteousness?" 119) Civil: "And so in the eyes of the world (coram mundo) our righteousness is ever active, never passive." (120) Melanchthon calls those "who by their own powers endeavor to fulfil the Law," "hypocrites." Thus the activity and agency of God are completely expelled from our horizontal lives which become "ever active, never passive." We have thus turned back to Rome. While we might not say, as Rome would have, that these civil works avail before God, we show by this blatant rejection of the agency of God in our daily lives that we no longer have any real understanding of sanctification. Sanctification becomes, as in the words of Adolf Köberle, "a purely transcendental thing... a mere object of hope and... something quite beyond the possibility of attainment in our present historical situation."

Therefore, from these examples of how Melanchthon understood "spiritual matters" (Apology Art. XVIII, Par. 73; Apology Art. XVI, Par. 54; Apology Art. XXVII, Par. 37; Apology Art. VII and VIII, Par. 31; Apology Art. XXIV, Par. 26; Apology Art IV, Par. 15-23), we can now begin to understand the terminology of "spiritual righteousness" We read the two occations of this terminology:

"Of Free Will they teach that man's will has some liberty to choose civil righteousness, and to work things subject to reason. But it has no power, without the Holy Ghost, to work the righteousness of God, that is, spiritual righteousness; since the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, 1 Cor. 2:14; but this righteousness is wrought in the heart when the Holy Ghost is received through the Word. These things are said in as many words by Augustine in his Hypognosticon, Book III: We grant that all men have a free will, free, inasmuch as it has the judgment of reason; not that it is thereby capable, without God, either to begin, or, at least, to complete aught in things pertaining to God, but only in works of this life, whether good or evil. "Good" I call those works which spring from the good in nature, such as, willing to labor in the field, to eat and drink, to have a friend, to clothe oneself, to build a house, to marry a wife, to raise cattle, to learn divers useful arts, or whatsoever good pertains to this life. For all of these things are not without dependence on the providence of God; yea, of Him and through Him they are and have their being. "Evil" I call such works as willing to worship an idol, to commit murder, etc. They condemn the Pelagians and others, who teach that without the Holy Ghost, by the power of nature alone, we are able to love God above all things; also to do the commandments of God as touching "the substance of the act." For, although nature is able in a manner to do the outward work, (for it is able to keep the hands from theft and murder,) yet it cannot produce the inward motions, such as the fear of God, trust in God, chastity, patience, etc." (Tappert, Augsburg Confession Art. XVIII, Par. 1-8)

Of note is the contrast between spiritual righteousness and civil righteousness; the terminology "righteousness of God" (expressed here as something that is "worked") which here is not synonymous with its usual meaning as imputed righteousness; that it is a righteousness that is "is wrought in the heart," thus not being imputed righteousness; it cannot be worked by human nature alone, but rather, the Holy Spirit is needed; the external "doing" is contrasted with the "inward motions" which include (both vertical and horizontal) "the fear of God, trust in God, chastity, patience, etc." (note the similar language in what was quoted above, namely, Apology Art. XVIII, Par. 73; Apology Art. VII and VIII, Par. 31).

The second example is much like the first:

"Therefore, although we concede to free will the liberty and power to perform the outward works of the Law, yet we do not ascribe to free will these spiritual matters, namely, truly to fear God, truly to believe God, truly to be confident and hold that God regards us, hears us, forgives us, etc. These are the true works of the First Table, which the heart cannot render without the Holy Ghost, as Paul says, 1 Cor. 2, 14: The natural man, i.e., man using only natural strength, receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God. (That is, a person who is not enlightened by the Spirit of God does not, by his natural reason, receive any thing of God's will and divine matters.] And this can be decided if men consider what their hearts believe concerning God's will, whether they are truly confident that they are regarded and heard by God. Even for saints to retain this faith [and, as Peter says (1 Pet. 1, 8), to risk and commit himself entirely to God, whom he does not see, to love Christ, and esteem Him highly, whom he does not see] is difficult, so far is it from existing in the godless. But it is conceived, as we have said above, when terrified hearts hear the Gospel and receive consolation [when we are born anew of the Holy Ghost].

"Therefore such a distribution is of advantage in which civil righteousness is ascribed to the free will and spiritual righteousness to the governing of the Holy Ghost in the regenerate. For thus the outward discipline is retained, because all men ought to know equally, both that God requires this civil righteousness [God will not tolerate indecent wild, reckless conduct], and that, in a measure, we can afford it. And yet a distinction is shown between human and spiritual righteousness, between philosophical doctrine and the doctrine of the Holy Ghost, and it can be understood for what there is need of the Holy Ghost. Nor has this distribution been invented by us, but Scripture most clearly teaches it. Augustine also treats of it, and recently it has been well treated of by William of Paris, but it has been wickedly suppressed by those who have dreamt that men can obey God's Law without the Holy Ghost, but that the Holy Ghost is given in order that, in addition, it may be considered meritorious." (Tappert, Apology Art. XVIII, Par. 73-76)

Again, of note is the contrast between the external act and the spiritual motivation; the repetition of much of the same language we have heard throughout: "truly to fear God, truly to believe God, truly to be confident and hold that God regards us, hears us, forgives us, etc.," "whether they are truly confident that they are regarded and heard by God," "it has been wickedly suppressed by those who have dreamt that men can obey God's Law without the Holy Ghost"; Melanchthon makes it clear that spiritual righteousness has to do with "the governing of the Holy Ghost in the regenerate," thus not an imputation from without. Likewise Melanchthon severely relegates the role of civil righteousness to preventing the gross expression of "indecent wild, reckless conduct" thus correlating it to the 1st, or civil use of the law which should never become a way of life.

Far from the sterile and undynamic presentation of the two kinds of righteousness, this look into what Melanchthon saw as spiritual tells us how interconnected the vertical and horizontal are; the continuous refrain of love/fear/trust/knowledge/prayer/hope in God and confidence that God hears and forgives us, the continuous refrain of the need for the power of Christ and of the Holy Spirit all tell us how interconnected the vertical is with the horizontal. None of this Confessional teaching will be retained if we see our horizontal lives as being "ever active, never passive."

The Paradox of Lutheranism: Extra Nos--In Nobis

Adolf Köberle believed that, historically, there are three ways in which man attempts to sanctify himself. Köberle writes:

"The sanctification of conduct by the strengthening of the will; the sanctification of the emotions by a strenuous training of the soul; the sanctification of thought by a deepening of the understanding; moralism, mysticism, speculation, these are the three ladders on which men continually seek to climb up to God, with a persistent purpose that it seems nothing can check; a storming of Heaven that is just as pathetic in its unceasing effort as in its final futility." The Quest for Holiness, trans. John C. Mattes (Minneapolis, Minn: Augsburg Publishing House, 1938), 2.

Köberle especially found Lutherans being polarized between the two extremes of moralism and mysticism. Köberle writes: "[It is] necessary to guard against both [reactions], against a presumptuous mysticism by an anti-mystical, forensic emphasis and against a superficial moral intellectualism by the entire living force of the Lutheran views concerning [the need for] grace." 112

Köberle saw the two extremes as, on the one hand, a type of divine immediacy of union, capability, and activity--mysticism--, and on the other hand, a type of transcendence where holiness is relegated to a future hope, while daily life is solely determined by one's natural ability to live, at least externally, upright--moralism. Of the second, Köberle will write: "There is another [error] that makes so little testimony of the Holy Ghost, Who quickeneth us, that we might think Christ had never risen and Pentecost had never happened. Here the new life appears as a purely transcendental thing, as a mere object of hope and as something quite beyond the possibility of attainment in our present historical situation." viii

The solution to these two extremes is what Köberle calls the "paradox of Lutheranism": extra nos--in nobis, that is, "the more external--the more inward." We read:

"The task is exactly the same for the orthodoxy of today. Mystical religiosity, "German piety," Indian teachings concerning salvation, cosmic transfigurations demand a theology of "contrast." In opposition to utilitarianism, the mechanizing of life and critical skepticism, however, it is necessary to proclaim the Gospel of inspiration through the Spirit of God. The paradox of Lutheranism, "the more external--the more inward" (extra nos--in nobis), is always incomprehensible to natural thinking or party feeling. The one who contends against the dangers now on the right, now on the left, because he understands them, may be accused, by those who fail to understand, of a lack of steadfastness; they will class him now among the mystics, now among those of a Judaizing tendency and then again among the mediating theologians, who travel in "an uncertain twilight." It is the burden of faith that to be obedient to God it can only express itself on earth by means of two contradictory thoughts...[It is] a curious paradox of concealment and manifestation, of the distance and nearness of God, of hope and the present possession of the Spirit." 112

For Köberle the balance of the two extremes of immediacy and transcendence comes through the correct understanding of the mediatorial nature of the condescension of God in his Word (connected with the ever-present Holy Spirit) and the Word made flesh; what is incarnational and sacramental. If you will allow me an extended quote, Köberle writes:

"Lutheranism has built its dykes on both sides. To ward off spiritualism [mysticism] and Spinozism [rationalistic moralism] it has made the statement: "deus non dat interna nisi per externa, deus spiritum sanctum non mittit absque verbo." [Latin is not my thing, but I believe this means: "God does not give internally except through what is external, God does not send the Holy Spirit without the Word] The Word with its judicial claims, with its power of establishing and maintaining communion with God, excludes the idea that the reception of the Spirit has to do with some essential condition based on an existing divine relationship. But in opposition to the abridgement of the Gospel into a purely transcendental faith the Formula of Concord taught just as emphatically in its christology as well as in its pneumatology and doctrine concerning the sacraments the personal, indwelling of the deus ipse [God himself], and even rejected the teachings of those who declared that only the gifts of God were present in the believer.

"How little the presence of God that is assured to faith has to do with pantheistic immanence theology has shown most effectively under the four viewpoints of the condescension of God, the reality and amissibility of faith and of eschatology. How far the possession of faith reaches beyond a supposedly impassible transcendence of God theology shows most clearly through the maintenance of the doctrine of the unio mystica in Word and Sacrament.

"It is due to the creditable work of John Rupprecht on Hermann Bezzel that attention has again been drawn to the theological significance of the idea of condescension, which had already been stressed by Hamann. God's "condescension" to the world in creation, preservation, incarnation and sacrament [all acts of the Word of God or the Word made flesh] does not come from any rational or natural-philosophical relation between God and man [it does not arise out of an essential connection between God and man, but is purely and freely initiated by God alone]. The humiliation of Christ in the "likeness of man," in the insignificance of "wretched, every-day natural agencies" He used, is an utter paradox; it is the gift of a love that freely gives and sacrifices itself. God's pardoning Word is a real word of pardon on which man has no natural claim. His entrance into the limitations of human speech in Scripture and preaching, with the possibility of being thus despised, is a deep abasement which He has freely chosen for the salvation of the world. This truly evangelical idea of the condescension of God, in which all of Luther's theologia crucis lies hidden, should be applied, as Bezzel does (ch. 5), to the inspiration of men, not because the finite is able by itself to appropriate the infinite, even though it does possess spiritual abilities, but because the Spirit, as well as the Son, humbles Himself in His ministering love, therefore man can become partaker of contact with the divine. Infinitum capax finiti [The infinite contains the finite]. God, Who in freely exercised omnipotence has reached down into time through the sending of the Son, still imparts Himself everywhere where men believe in Jesus Christ.

"By means of the idea of condescension the sovereignty of God is preserved in the evangelical conception of immanence. The emphasis on the real nature of this "in-dwelling" gives to every statement a still stronger note of reverent dependence. As we have already pointed out, mysticism describes the union of God and the soul in sentimental naturalistic terms. It speaks of a substantial marriage of the human and divine spirit that ends in an act of union where all distinctions cease. But wherever the Deus in nobis [God in us] is affirmed on the basis of the Christus pro nobis [Christ for us], Who is accepted by faith, there can be no talk of an absorption and submersion into a state of static being. When the Word becomes the vehicle of the Spirit the ideas of judgement and guilt are not excluded, then the awakened conscience discards the presumptuous idea of identity, and the ecstasy of a being-like-God. Only in the attitude of simple faith can the nearness of the Lord be received, for in all His gracious surrender to man He is never absorbed by him, any more than the Creator disappears in His creation." 104-105

There are a couple of key lines I want to point out: 1) "The Word with its judicial claims, with its power of establishing and maintaining communion with God, excludes the idea that the reception of the Spirit has to do with some essential condition based on an existing divine relationship." 2) "When the Word becomes the vehicle of the Spirit the ideas of judgement and guilt are not excluded, then the awakened conscience discards the presumptuous idea of identity, and the ecstasy of a being-like-God." That is, it is the Word of God that tells me who I am and what my relationship is before God and before man. It tells me I am a saint and a sinner. The law exposes and condemns me and the gospel shows me that I am forgiven and creates new life. The Word of God tells me I am am neither autonomous from God nor that I can become God. It establishes the social and vocational structures of life. In this social and vocational structure, the Word of God shows me the qualitative character of what life is supposed to be like, that is, a life of reciprocal love where I love God with all my heart, soul, mind, and strength, and where I love my neighbor as myself. As Piotr Malysz points out, it is only through God's relation to us that we can define who we are. He writes:

"The problem is not alien even to the Bible itself. The Psalmist asks, "what is man that you are mindful of him" (Ps 8:4). It must not be overlooked that, in contradistinction to the questions posed from within human experience, this one implies going beyond that experience; that is, a relationship. The theological definition of humanity presupposes involvement on God's part. Humanity can only be defined from the outside, and that because of the mindfulness of God. Only by making reference to this external perspective can the questions that originate within the world be given meaningful answers." "Third Use of the Law in Light of Creation and the Fall," Logia 11, no. 3 (2002), 11.

A little later Malysz will write: "To be human is not so much to have some capacity for God as to have God relate to one and to reflect his being oneself." 13

It is only through this external factor, the extra nos, that we can determine the internal, the in nobis. To say otherwise is to reject the relational structure of our very existence (see my post: The Word, Communication, and Sanctification). Without taking this into consideration man becomes either the autonomous locus of his existence, or on the other hand, expresses a divinization of being where all distinctions between God and man cease.

With this also understood, Lutherans can combat the criticism (often from our own camp) of sanctification being a theology of glory. On the contrary, Köberle's "paradox of Lutheranism" is a rejection of either an autonomous or divinized "in nobis" that exalts the self, and on the other hand, the extra nos gives us the immeasurable glad tidings that God condescendingly loves us and desires to relate to us. The paradox of Lutheranism is the ultimate theologia crucis: the condescension of God and the rejection of "man in himself." The hidden God comes to us, and we are driven to the hidden God in the forms of Word and Sacrament.

Lutheran Quote of the Day: Köberle on "Subjective Grace"

I was interested to find out that the terminology,"obective grace" and "subjective grace," has a history (some of which I agree with, some of which I don't). You know...I just make this trash up, lol.

Here is a quote from Adolf Köberle's seminal work, The Quest for Holiness, reaffirming some of the points in my post, "Hey! Lets Keep It Forensic in Here!". Namely, he states that the experience of grace in the reception of faith (subjective justification) is not dependent on the subject's experience but on the objective Word of revelation. Therefore he want's us to affirm that we should not be suspicious of "subjective grace" (though he doesn't use this terminology) as it finds it's basis outside of ourselves in the objective promises of God.

"For the faith that becomes active in apprehension and emotion does not desire to derive its strength from itself. The "experience" of grace does not put itself confidently into God's place, as it were the actual donor and mediator of grace; it does not depend on its own consciousness; it does not come out of some wellspring of inner nature. It is something purely receptive, begotten and animated by the reality of the divine gift that is apprehended by faith. For this reason we cannot offhand reject the idea of an "experience" of faith as something suspicious and unevangelical, so long as the subjective experience we possess does not come out of some "little paradise of our own domain of the soul," but is begotten and mediated through an objective word of revelation that is accepted by faith."

-The Quest for Holiness, trans. John C. Mattes (Minneapolis, Minn: Augsburg Publishing House, 1938), 78.